Understanding Humans: Lessons from the Financial Crash

The global economic crash at the end of the last decade prompted much analysis in the financial sector. Great efforts were made to try and understand why bankers acted in the way that they did and why their behaviour wasn’t challenged sooner. This research has raised some very interesting points; particularly the study of why well-intentioned rules and regulations are violated and how this allows a better understanding of human behaviour.

Perhaps too much effort has been made in the past within the maritime sector in identifying how people violated the rules, and reacting by adapting the rules to prevent future violation, rather than understanding why people contravened the rules and therefore tackling the root of the problem.

Studying Human Behaviour

A paper by Dr Roger Miles titled Tracing the True Origins of Bad Behaviour: New Ways to Predict Conduct Risk Exposure looked at the aftermath of the credit crunch. An immediate thought might be “what has bankers behaving badly got to do with maritime safety?” But the paper contains many observations that are easily recognisable to the mariner’s eye.

It tells us that to really understand why a person or a group of people acted in the way they did, we need to look deeper into their biases and behaviours.

“Unsafe” behaviour arises when certain conditions are in place. If these can be identified then efforts can be made to stop the problem before it takes root. The conditions as described in Dr Miles’ research are of course largely unique to the financial industry but it does not require too much imagination to see how it could apply to the maritime sector and safety. They can be paraphrased as follows to relate to shipping:

• ‘Longevity’: A high turnover of staff within the shore management can lead to ships’ crews thinking they will outlast whoever is driving any changes
• ‘Balance of Power’: The crews hold more power and influence in the operation and management of the vessels than the senior management
• ‘Abstraction’: Crews’ perceptions of risk and their abilities to identify hazards and assess risks
• ‘Unchallenged’: A lack of oversight or distant relationship by senior shore management
• ‘Incentive to Move’: If the crew know they can leave the company and be employed elsewhere on equal or more generous terms with little consequence then this can stifle loyalty to the company
• ‘Granular Regulation’: Negative effect of over-regulation and micromanagement on the crew

Wah! Knowing what actually happens

The finding that relates most strikingly to the maritime sector is the ‘disconnect’ that can exist between the different parties and introduces the concept of the ‘formal structure’ and the ‘informal structure’.

The formal structure comprises of what has been written down by the organisation’s management and includes charts, mission statements, job descriptions and manuals. The informal structure is “What Actually Happens” (WAH) and this is the reality on board the ship. Safety violations and incidents occur as a direct result of what actually happens in reality.

This supports earlier work by academics on safety such as that by Hollnagel where the concepts of “work as imagined” and “work as done” are discussed. It is the ‘disconnect’ between those who decide on the policies and procedures and those who actually carry them out.

So what influences people and why does this disconnect exist between the different parties?

We’re only human

Human Reaction to Rules: On their own, written rules and codes are not effective ways to control people and influence behaviour. It is wrong to assume that a person’s default position on rules and regulations is that of honest and simple compliance.

Also, people modify their behaviour in an adverse way if the rules are too strict or restrictive. Their behaviour can adapt quite creatively and can ultimately lead to pushback against the system. If people are treated like idiots they will act like idiots.

Measuring Performance: Performance cannot always be effectively monitored and assessed by reviewing systems and carrying out planned audits.Performance is best assessed by the direct observation of people’s behaviour by independent and random audits.

Communication: Upwards reporting of non-compliances is often filtered. This prevents the full WAH picture from being known by senior management, who then have a more optimistic view on the safety culture than the actual reality.

The most powerful forecaster of unsafe behaviour is when people won’t talk about unsafe behaviour – consider the reporting of incidents, near misses and ISM non-conformities. The absence of these reports certainly does not mean that incidents are not happening.

Tribal Loyalties: Where do people’s loyalties lie? Possibly the strongest influence on a person’s behaviour is the behaviour of their work group and peers. This determines what is “normal”. It is human nature to adapt behaviour in order to fit in with the work group even if it is known what goes on is fundamentally wrong. This influencing work group consists of people who are generally the same status, includes their immediate managers, but, very importantly, excludes senior management.

The work groups have loyalties primarily to their own “tribe” and resist any intervention from senior management. They state “this how we do things around here”, but in the negative sense of the term. It is easy to see how this could apply to a shipping company – senior management versus crew with superintendents somewhere between the two.

The Tone at the Middle: People don’t just make up their own sense of a rule, they watch for signals from those around them to see if it really does apply to them. So, if the formal rule or written procedure says one thing, but their colleagues or line manager say another, then the local version will win more often than not.

The top-down efforts on creating and maintaining an effective safety culture remain vitally important, where senior management must be unequivocal and unambiguous in the message. But there must also now be a realisation that the “tone in the middle” is a significant influence in people’s behaviour.

Where now?

• Strong leadership is essential with an unequivocal and unambiguous position on safety
• There needs to be the right share of accountability at each level within the company, ashore and on board, with the appropriate amount of oversight
• Strong relationships and trust amongst ship, shore and senior management personnel
• Safety management systems must be sensible and workable. The crew must have input into the process
• A stable and secure workforce could help promote belonging and loyalty
• Crews need to have the ability to identify hazards and assess risks – ensure training provisions recognise this
• The decision makers ashore and senior management must know what actually happens on board the vessels – tackle the ‘disconnect’ between “work as imagined” and “what actually happens”
• Rethink the auditing and performance measurement systems to better assess the reality of “what actually happens”

Author: Alvin Forster
Deputy Director (Loss Prevention)