Engine Failure Shows the Value in Managing Third Party Contractors

The Scenario

In 2018, the Lithuanian-flagged ro-ro cargo vessel Finlandia Seaways was on a regular voyage from Zeebrugge to Rosyth when one of the main engine’s connecting rods broke. Internal rotating components were thrown through the side of the crankcase into the engine room, and a short but intense fire occurred.

Within 20 minutes the crew had mustered, closed down the machinery spaces and activated the carbon dioxide fixed firefighting system.

The vessel’s third engineer, who was on duty at the time, suffered serious smoke-related lung, kidney, and eye injuries during his escape from the engine room. He was recovered by a coastguard helicopter and transferred to hospital for medical care, making a successful recovery.

Investigation Findings

It was found that a fracture of the connecting rod small end (where the connecting rod attaches to the piston) had led to the sudden and catastrophic failure of the main engine.

To ascertain the causal factors that resulted in the failure, the investigation looked at the engine maintenance arrangements and component history. The affected connecting rod’s small end had completed just over 90,000 running hours, which was 10,000 hours fewer than the recommended limit set by the engine manufacturer – signifying premature failure.

Minor routine maintenance was carried out by ship’s crew, but major overhauls were contracted out to a third-party ship repair company. The investigation found that the way the contracted third-party replaced the piston pin bearing bushes on the connecting rods introduced stress raisers that significantly increased the likelihood of crack initiation and fatigue failure. This was despite the contractor’s formal work procedure being similar to the correct method stated by the engine manufacturer. Quite simply, the contractor didn’t follow their own procedure and the small ends had been damaged during the piston pin bush removal and fitting process.

When the investigators visited the contractor’s workshop, it was found that because they were not accredited by the engine manufacturer, they did not have access to all of the manufacturer’s piston pin bush removal and installation tools and procedures. The investigation also noted weaknesses in the company’s quality management system, in particular the failure to provide documentation on when and by whom servicing was carried out.

Delegating Maintenance

There are many good reasons why a shipowner will outsource major overhauls of machinery and equipment. But as this investigation report shows, it is vital that they satisfy themselves that their appointed contractor is suitably qualified to carry out the work, that they carry out the work correctly, and that they have suitable quality management systems in place to record when and by whom the work was carried out.

Under Article III of the Hague / Hague Visby Rules which are commonly incorporated into the contracts of carriage (e.g. bills of lading) a shipowner has a duty to exercise due diligence to make the ship seaworthy at the beginning of the voyage. This duty cannot be delegated.

This means that if a third-party contractor does not carry out the work correctly, and their error/ omissions makes the vessel unseaworthy, it will be the shipowner rather than the third-party contractor that will be potentially responsible for any resulting losses suffered by the owners of the cargo.

If a shipowner fails to exercise due diligence to make the ship seaworthy at the beginning of the voyage, and the unseaworthiness is proved to be causative to the loss, then the shipowner will no longer be entitled to rely upon the defences that are contained in Article IV of the Hague / Hague Visby Rules to avoid liability. It will also prevent the shipowner from claiming General Average (“GA”) contributions from the owners of the cargo / bunkers.

In order to bring a successful claim and/or avoid liability to contribute in GA, the owners of the cargo or bunkers would first have to prove that the vessel was unseaworthy and that the unseaworthiness was causative to the loss suffered – which with a machinery breakdown is likely to be relatively straightforward.

After it has been established that the vessel was unseaworthy, the shipowner will then have the legal burden of proving that there was no actionable fault on their behalf – i.e. that there was no want of due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy – in order to avoid liability for the claim, or to recover the GA contributions that are due from the owners of the cargo or bunkers. As all the relevant evidence on causation and due diligence will be in the hands of the shipowner, the evidential burden will be upon the shipowner to produce it.

With any claim, evidence is key. A Shipowner’s position is therefore much stronger when they can a) demonstrate that they exercised due diligence in employing a suitable contractor; and b) demonstrate that the quality management systems in place adequately records when and by whom the work was carried out as well as preventing any defective work slipping through the net.

Find Out More

Read the Finlandia Seaways MAIB report